No-Poach Agreements and Wage-Fixing Practices: When Labour Market Collusion Becomes an Antitrust Issue
Keywords:
antitrust law, labour rights, no-poach agreements, wage-fixing, economic lawAbstract
This article analyses the growing role of labour markets in competition policy, arguing that collusion between employers – particularly no-poach agreements and wage-fixing practices – should be assessed with the same severity as classic cartels. Using a doctrinal and comparative approach, it presents the legal frameworks and enforcement trends in the United States, the European Union, and Poland. The text conceptualizes hiring as a market transaction in which employers act as buyers of labour and employees as its suppliers, and shows how no-poach and wage-fixing agreements distort mobility, reduce wages, and weaken workers’ bargaining power. It then discusses the convergences and divergences across jurisdictions: US authorities increasingly pursue criminal proceedings against ‘naked’ restraints; EU policy and case law tend to classify wage-fixing and many no-poach agreements as restrictions ‘by object’ (Article 101 TFEU); Polish practice adopts an effects-based approach. The article also addresses the issue of so-called ancillary restraints in the context of collaborations (e.g. franchising, joint ventures) and indicates when – if at all – recruitment bans may be considered objectively necessary and proportionate.
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